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Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: 
The Importance of Constraints on Non-Rational 
Deliberations 
John N. Drobak∗ 
Douglass C. North∗∗ 
All of social science is based on the assumption that people act 
rationally, in a logical, unemotional fashion. This is true for all 
disciplines in social science, including both economics and law. 
Neoclassical price theory assumes that producers and consumers are 
rational actors, while the reasonable person in law is the rational 
cousin to the economic actor. New institutional economists were 
among the first scholars to examine economic issues by modifying 
rational choice theory. Today, a large and growing body of 
scholarship exhibits a willingness to modify the rationality 
assumption by using cognitive science, behavioral psychology, and 
experimental economics. This Article shares that perspective. In the 
Article, we reexamine the way judges make decisions by using 
contemporary theories from cognitive science and concepts from the 
new institutional economics.  
The dominant model of judicial decision-making is an outgrowth 
of rational choice theory: the judge is a rational actor who reasons 
logically from facts, previous decisions, statutes, and constitutions to 
reach a decision.1  Everyone knows, however, that this model 
explains only part of the process. From the Legal Realists in the first 
half of the twentieth century to the Critical Legal Theorists today, this 
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 1. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 865 
(1988); see Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
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model has been criticized for failing to include non-doctrinal factors 
that affect the outcome of cases.2  In order to understand fully how 
judges decide cases, we need to understand how the mind works. We 
need to know how judges perceive the issues involved in lawsuits, 
how they see competing priorities and available choices, and how 
they make their decisions. These are the same questions involved in 
understanding human decision-making in general. Behavioral 
psychologists and cognitive scientists have studied decision-making 
for centuries, but our knowledge of the brain’s processes is still very 
primitive. 
This Article attempts to contribute to our knowledge of judicial 
decision-making. It begins by considering the relevance of judicial 
discretion and non-doctrinal factors to the outcome of court cases and 
then uses the concept of belief systems from the new institutional 
economics to help our understanding of discretion. The next part of 
the Article explains some contemporary theories of cognition that 
lead us to conclude that non-doctrinal factors and discretion are 
inherent in judicial decision-making. Then the Article considers the 
constraints built into the judicial process, which act as a limitation on 
judicial discretion in most cases. These constraints on judges also 
make it appear as if they are deciding cases in the manner described 
by the rational, doctrinal theory of judicial decision-making, even 
when they are not. Although we would like to conclude with a model 
that accurately includes discretion and non-doctrinal factors, the state 
of knowledge of human decision-making is still too primitive to 
allow us to do that. Rather, we return to the usefulness of the rational 
choice model in a constrained environment. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF DISCRETION 
The importance of judicial discretion has been well-known since 
judges began resolving disputes. It also has generated unending 
attempts to limit discretion and to make judicial outcomes more 
predictable. For example, the great civil codes of eighteenth century 
 
 2. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horowitz & 
Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, LEGAL REALISM NOW 465 (1988) 
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–1960 (1986). 
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Europe were designed to provide answers for all contingencies. As 
Roscoe Pound explained, the court would function as “a sort of 
judicial slot machine. The necessary machinery had been provided in 
advance by legislation or by received legal principles and one had but 
to put in the facts above and take out the decision below.”3 Of course 
it is impossible to create this type of judicial slot machine. Similar 
concerns about unpredictability led to the creation of the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) in the early twentieth century. Unhappy 
with the discretion accorded judges by the “rule of reason” in 
Sherman Act cases, a coalition of business leaders and progressive 
reformers wanted a commission that would write a “Code of Good 
Business Practices” establishing in advance precise rules of what was 
and what was not illegal anticompetitive conduct. Congress created 
the FTC, but the FTC could not create this kind of code. Drafting a 
code that covered every possible anticompetitive act would be 
possible only in a world where the fundamental underlying structure 
of the economy is constant and therefore timeless. Not surprisingly, 
the FTC shortly gave up on the enterprise.4 
Legal doctrine and methodology have a great influence on the 
outcome of all court cases. The terms of constitutions and statutes, 
the dictates of case law, and the methodology for applying them in a 
lawsuit all limit the discretion of judges and direct the outcome of the 
case. Yet in many lawsuits, something else is crucial to the outcome. 
The unpredictability of the decision in some cases stems from the 
dynamic nature of the world. With new products, new processes, new 
financial instruments, new corporate forms, new modes of 
communications, and on and on, the legal system must continually 
adapt to new kinds of unanticipated disputes. The world is too 
complex and dynamic to enable even a comprehensive statutory 
regime to provide answers for all the problems that are sure to arise. 
In addition, the imprecision of language often makes for ambiguous, 
incomplete statutes even when the drafters know the contingencies 
 
 3. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 170 (1921). 
 4. See ELEANOR M. FOX, LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 48–51 (2d ed. 2004); GERALD C. 
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 1–48 (1924). 
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they want to address. Common law decision-making relies heavily on 
analogy to past decisions. However, this methodology breaks down 
as new problems, distinct from old answers, arise. Many judges and 
scholars agree that statutes and precedents often narrow the range of 
potential outcomes but do not point to the only possible answer.5 
Somehow the judge must choose from that narrow range of justifiable 
outcomes. 
Notwithstanding the role of discretion, most people accept the 
rational doctrinal model of judicial decision-making. This is not 
surprising because legal scholars, judges, and lawyers focus on 
doctrine when they analyze the law. Judicial opinions explain the 
application of constitutional provisions, statutes, and judicial 
precedents through accepted methods of statutory interpretation and 
case analysis. Arguments are made logically, step-by-step to a 
conclusion, almost as if the law were a form of mathematics. This 
approach is comforting because it shows law to be impersonal and 
based on rational action. Plus, most legal questions are 
straightforward enough to be answered by doctrine with little 
appearance of discretion.6 The focus on legal doctrine is also 
understandable because it relies on written materials and processes 
that can be explained. This is the visible part of the law. However, the 
non-doctrinal factors that make up discretion are an invisible part of 
judicial decision-making that cannot be explained with any precision 
given our primitive understanding of how the mind works. Think of a 
curtain that divides our understanding of the judicial process. We 
 
 5. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 131 (1990); 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 2, at 164–65; Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of 
Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 14 (1998); SINGER, supra note 2, at 465. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes explained the indeterminacy of common law reasoning as follows: 
Two widely different cases suggest a general distinction, which is a clear one when 
stated broadly. But as new cases cluster around the opposite poles, and begin to 
approach each other, this distinction becomes more difficult to trace; the 
determinations are made one way or the other on a very slight preponderance of 
feeling, rather than of articulate reason; and at last a mathematical line is arrived at by 
the contrast of contrary decisions, which is so far arbitrary that it might equally have 
been drawn a little farther to the one side or to the other, but which must have been 
drawn somewhere in the neighborhood where it falls. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 101 (1881). 
 6. Posner, supra note 1, at 890. 
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know what is visible in front of the curtain: written doctrine, accepted 
methodology, etc. But we only know a little bit about what lies 
behind the curtain, although we know something is there. The judicial 
world is not like the Land of Oz, where we can pull back the curtain 
to see the real source of decisions. No matter how hard we try today, 
we cannot understand all the hidden factors that influence judicial 
outcomes. 
For over a decade, a branch of political science has attempted to 
explain case outcomes with empirical methodology that focuses on 
characteristics of judges, such as whether they are liberal or 
conservative or whether they were appointed by a Republican or 
Democrat President.7 This approach jars legal scholars because it 
completely disregards the effects of legal doctrine. What this 
approach does, however, is demonstrate that something other than 
doctrine strongly influences the outcome of many cases. It shows the 
importance of the hidden factors, even though it does not help us 
understand what they are or how they influence the results. 
That something beyond legal doctrine influences judicial decision-
making is no surprise. In his classic article, The Path of the Law, 
published over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes emphasized 
the unconscious factors that influence a judge: 
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of 
logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for 
certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But 
certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of 
man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative 
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often 
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment it is true, and yet the 
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.8 
The Legal Realists tried to move beyond legal formalism in 
explaining the outcome of cases, emphasizing the indeterminacy of 
legal doctrine and method and the consequent importance of the 
 
 7. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, CHOICES JUDGES MADE (1998); JEFFREY A. 
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); 
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (2007). 
 8. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (1897). 
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judges’ preferences.9 They believed that legal rules and methodology 
did not lead to a certain answer in many cases and therefore left the 
outcome to the preferences of the judge. Some were even skeptical 
that the reasons given in opinions for the outcome of cases actually 
explained why the judges reached their decisions.10 Although the 
realists’ criticism of judicial decision-making was well developed, 
they had difficulty moving beyond criticism.11 One branch of Legal 
Realism advocated more attention to psychological factors. For 
example, Jerome Frank asserted that judges should undergo Freudian 
psychoanalysis to better understand their own prejudices and, as a 
result, become better judges.12 Over time, to many commentators, 
Legal Realism became a caricature remembered solely for the claim 
that the outcome of cases was only a matter of “what the judge had 
for breakfast.”13 Without a doubt, however, the Legal Realists made a 
valuable contribution to jurisprudence by their emphasis on the 
importance of the hidden factors in judicial decision-making. Their 
legacy remains influential today. 
 
 9. SINGER, supra note 2, at 470; Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 697, 707 (1931). Legal realism was not only a jurisprudential response to the 
classical legal theory of the late 19th century, which provided the underpinnings of the Lochner 
era. SINGER supra note 2, at 474–75. It was also a political response to the Lochner-era 
holdings and a justification for the change in judicial response to economic regulation. Id. at 
495. Many prominent legal realists served in the federal government during the New Deal and 
helped shape important reforms. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 2, at xiv. As an 
intellectual movement, legal realism laid the foundation for much of modern legal theory, 
including empirical analysis, law and economics and critical legal studies. Id. at xiv; SINGER, 
supra note 2, at 503–05. Finally, from the content of casebooks, to the discussions of policy and 
to the use of the social sciences, modern legal education bears the imprint of the legal realists. 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 2, at 270–73; SINGER, supra note 2, at 473–75. 
 10. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9 (1921); Joseph C. 
Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 
CORNELL L.Q. 274, 279 (1929); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 
24 (1924). 
 11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 3 (2001) (“Legal realism had 
failed to deliver on its promises, and by the end of World War II had petered out.”); Roscoe 
Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1931) (cannot build a 
“science of law . . . merely on the basis of such criticism”). 
 12. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 248 (1949); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND 147 (1930). 
 13. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 36 (1986); SINGER, supra note 2, at 469–70; 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 2, at xiv. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL BELIEF SYSTEMS 
More than 85 years ago, before cognitive science became 
fashionable or, indeed, was even of concern, Frederick Hayek wrote 
an early draft of The Sensory Order,14 a book about cognitive science, 
which was published in 1952 but written in 1920. For Hayek, beliefs 
are a construction of the mind as interpreted by the senses. We do not 
reproduce reality; rather, we construct systems of classifications to 
interpret the external environment. As Hayek wrote in The Sensory 
Order: 
Perception is thus always an interpretation, the placing of 
something into one or several classes of objects. The qualities 
which we attribute to the experienced object are, strictly 
speaking, not properties of that object at all, but a set of 
relations by which our nervous system classifies them. Or, to 
put it differently, all we know about the world is of the nature 
of theories, and all experience can do is change these 
theories.15 
Hayek conceived of the semi-permanent network of connections 
among nerve fibers as mapping the classification process. Given that 
structure, the mind models the immediate environment. A 
reinterpretation of reality occurs when the prevailing model, or set of 
maps, produces unanticipated results, forcing a reclassification. 
However, such reclassification is constrained by deep-seated tacit 
rules that determine the flexibility of the mind to adjust. For Hayek, 
the mind is inseparably connected with the environment: 
[T]he apparatus by means of which we learn about the external 
world is of itself the product of a kind of experience. It is 
shaped by the conditions prevailing in the environment in 
which we live, and it represents a kind of generic reproduction 
of the relations between the elements of this environment 
 
 14. F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952). 
 15. Id. at 143. 
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which we have experienced in the past, and we interpret any 
new event in the environment in the light of that experience.16 
It follows that the experiences that have shaped the mental 
classifications in the mind can and frequently will lead to 
misinterpretations of the problems confronting the individual. 
Hayek maintained that the classification of the stimuli performed 
by our senses will be based on a system of acquired connections that 
reproduce in a partial and imperfect manner the relationships existing 
in the external environment. Our minds do not reproduce reality; 
rather, they attempt to interpret the very complex relationships in 
what are always theories. We may know all the facts and numbers 
possible about a particular set of events, but to order them and to 
explain them requires theory, and that theory, obviously, is a 
construction of the mind. 
This does not mean that all results are subjective. Obviously, what 
we try to do is to test the theories we have against the evidence so 
that we can arrive at rough, very rough, estimates of the reliability of 
such theories. But it does mean that all the theories we have are 
subjective; they are always imperfect and incomplete. 
Individuals from different backgrounds will interpret the same 
evidence differently and in consequence make different choices. 
Individuals have different systems of beliefs that create different 
filters through which they perceive the world and its problems and 
also create different theories to explain the world and devise solutions 
for the problems. These belief systems develop from life experiences 
with a myriad of influences—from parents and family, peers, 
teachers, religious authorities, government leaders, public 
commentators, and so on. Judges, of course, have their own belief 
systems, just like everyone else. And it is differing belief systems that 
make for judges with differing judicial philosophies and for judges to 
be labeled either liberal or conservative or either activist or 
restrained. 
It is obvious that the belief systems of judges are part of the 
hidden aspects of judging. Many judges openly admit the impact their 
 
 16. Id. at 165. 
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belief systems have on their decisions, often in an unconscious and 
unexplainable way. As Holmes explained: 
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, 
and always with apology, are the secret root from which the 
law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course, 
considerations of what is expedient for the community 
concerned. Every important principle which is developed by 
litigation is in fact and at the bottom the result of more or less 
definitely understood views or public policy; most generally, 
to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious 
result of instinctive preferences and inarticulated 
convictions. . . .17 
The indeterminacy of the judicial process described above leaves 
an opening for belief systems to affect outcomes. In addition, some of 
the methods used to decide particular types of cases invite judges to 
act on their own belief systems. A “balancing” test, common in 
constitutional law, frequently requires judges to balance 
incomparable considerations.18 For example, in regulatory takings 
cases, a judge must determine the outcome by balancing the harm to 
the aggrieved party against the benefit to society, usually when harm 
and benefit cannot be quantified.19 Another common approach 
requires judges to look at a number of factors and make a decision 
based on the totality of the circumstances.20 Some judges will view 
one factor as important; other judges will disregard that factor and 
concentrate on another. 
The high stakes battle over the appointment of Supreme Court 
Justices is a constant reminder of the importance of a particular 
justice’s judicial philosophy. Many dissenting opinions are a 
testament to the differing belief systems of the various justices. There 
must be tens of thousands of cases in the history of American law 
that would have turned out differently if different people had ruled in 
 
 17. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 31 (1881). 
 18. It is ironic that the Legal Realists were proponents of balancing tests, which make 
judicial discretion more important. SINGER, supra note 2, at 504. 
 19. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). 
 20. See, e.g., Penn. Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1977). 
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the case. Just one example is Brown v. Board of Education,21 which 
scholars believe would have upheld Plessy v. Fergeson22 if Chief 
Justice Vinson had not died and been replaced by Earl Warren after 
argument but before decision.23 
We can identify the belief systems of judges as having a major 
influence on the outcome of cases, but we cannot explain this 
relationship with any precision or detail. We need to understand how 
belief systems are formed, how to classify them, and how to link 
belief systems with outcomes in cases that involve competing 
policies. Although political scientists are getting better and better in 
using empirical methodology to predict and explain how judges 
vote,24 their scholarship is not directed at helping us understand the 
formation and effects of the judges’ belief systems. 
III. THEORIES OF HUMAN DECISION-MAKING 
Our lack of understanding of belief systems is part of the broader 
problem of our inability to explain human decision making in 
general. Scientific research about the brain is too primitive to give us 
answers to these questions. As a result, we make do with theories, 
models, and even educated guesses developed by cognitive scientists 
and behavioral psychologists. The models and theories used in law, 
economics, and other social sciences are, for the most part, grounded 
in rational choice theory. 
Philosophers since the Age of Enlightenment have equated human 
reason with the laws of probability and logic.25 This has been refined 
and formalized over the years so that the modern view of human 
behavior incorporates two complementary models: expected utility 
theory and Bayes’ theorem.26 These models view human decision-
 
 21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 23. E.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 655–56, 678–99 (1975). 
 24. See, e.g., Theodore Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and 
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1150 (2004). 
 25. Valarie M. Chase, Ralph Hertwig & Gerd Gigerenzer, Visions of Rationality, in 2 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 206 (1998). 
 26. Expected utility theory and Bayes’ theorem are described technically as follows: 
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making to be like that of a computer: knowing, ordered, logical, and 
calculating. The two models, usually lumped together as rational 
choice theory, play a central role in much of modern social science, 
including both economics and law.27 The models have become so 
powerful to some social scientists that they see the models “as norms 
against which human reasoning can be evaluated rather than as a 
codification of it: when the two diverge, it is concluded that there is 
something wrong with the reasoning, not with the norms.”28 
However, some cognitive scientists have emphasized that rational 
choice theory is not based on how the mind works. For example, 
Andy Clark starts with the research that shows the brain to be a mass 
of neural networks and then concludes that human reasoning is a 
combination of fast pattern recognition coupled with manipulation of 
and constraints by the external environment.29 As he explains: 
 
Fundamentally, on the theory of (subjective) expected utility, problem solving or 
decision making requires a strategy set, a set of outcomes associated with each 
alternative in that set, a utility function defined over the outcomes and a rule for 
maximizing expected utility . . . The agent must know the alternative strategies 
available and be able to predict their consequences or likely consequences. There must 
be a utility function ordering possible futures and a decision rule based on the array of 
futures associated with the various alternatives. The model has proved to be 
remarkably resilient, and over the 50 years following John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern’s (1947) revival of it, the theory has been elaborated in a variety of ways 
which enhance its descriptive adequacy: it has been extended to incorporate subjective 
weighting of alternatives, to take into account various attitudes toward risk, and to 
allow for nonlinear preference functions. A Bayesian model of human reasoning, 
similarly, requires an exhaustive set of hypotheses, a probability distribution on those 
hypotheses which is coherent, and conditional probability assignments for evidence on 
the various alternative hypotheses. . . . In order to assess the impact of some piece of 
evidence, an individual must know the theoretical alternatives and how likely each is 
on prior evidence. The probability assignments to the various hypotheses must meet 
the conditions on coherence laid down in the probability calculus. To then determine 
the impact of evidence on a given hypothesis, the individual must know how likely 
that evidence is on each of the competing alternative hypotheses.  
Robert C. Richardson, Heuristics and Satisfying, in A COMPANION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 566, 
566–67 (William Bechtel & George Graham ed., 1998). 
 27. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Jack Knight & Douglass C. North, 
Explaining Economic Change: The Interplay Between Cognition and Institutions, 3 LEGAL 
THEORY 211 (1997); Debra Satz & John Ferejohn, Rational Choice and Social Theory, 91 J. 
PHIL. 71 (1994). 
 28. Chase, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, supra note 25, at 206. 
 29. ANDY CLARK, BEING THERE: PUTTING BRAIN, BODY, AND WORLD TOGETHER AGAIN 
60–63, 184–86 (1977). Clark explains:  
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Most of us, it is argued, can learn to know at a glance the 
answers to simple multiplications, such as 7 x 7 = 49. Such 
knowledge could easily be supported by a basic on-board 
pattern-recognition device. But longer multiplications present a 
different kind of problem. Asked to multiply 722 x 9422, most 
of us resort to pen and paper (or a calculator). What we 
achieve, using pen and paper, is a reduction of the complex 
problem to a sequence of simpler problems beginning with 2 x 
2. We use the external medium (paper) to store the results of 
these simple problems, and by an interrelated series of simple 
pattern completions coupled with external storage we finally 
arrive at a solution.30 
Not only does the external environment provide a wealth of tools 
for storing experience and methods for doing the manipulations and 
calculations, it also constrains (or “scaffolds” to use Clark’s term) the 
reasoning process.31 Relying on the work of Satz and Ferejohn32 and 
of Denzau and North,33 Clark concludes that the rational choice 
model works best in instances of “highly scaffolded choice,” as in the 
competitive environment of capital markets, and falters as the 
constraints weaken. 
Most scholars who investigate how judges make decisions stay 
true to the rational choice model, believing that deliberation and 
rational decision-making are the central part of the process.34 That is 
 
The brain is composed of many simple processing units (neurons) linked in parallel by 
a large mass of wiring and junctions (axions and synapses). The individual units 
(neurons) are generally sensitive only to local information—each ‘listens’ to what its 
neighbors are telling it. Yet, out of this mass of parallel connections, simple processors 
and local interactions there emerges the amazing computational and problem-solving 
powers of the human brain.  
Id. at 54. 
 30. Id. at 60–61. 
 31. Id. at 45–47, 60–63, 179–92. 
 32. Satz & Ferejohn, supra note 27. 
 33. Arthur Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and 
Institutions, 47 KYKLOS 3 (1994). 
 34. Recent legal scholarship about judges’ decision-making processes has modified 
rational choice theory models with behavioral assumptions. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey L. 
Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, working 
paper; Simon, supra note 1. Just as the behavioral literature that relies on heuristics and biases 
uses a rational choice-based model, so does this recent scholarship on judicial decision-making. 
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a comforting thought, because most of us would be shocked to learn 
that a sentence of life or death or an award of $100 million resulted 
from a combination of fast pattern recognition coupled with 
manipulation of and constraints by the external environment. 
Nonetheless, the mismatch between the rational choice model and the 
actual operation of the brain should remind us that theories of judicial 
decision-making that are grounded in rational choice theory are only 
models, albeit very useful ones. 
There are other competing theories of how people make decisions. 
Recently, some cognitive scientists have emphasized the importance 
of simple decision-making rules.35 Try as we might to do otherwise, 
our brains use simple decision rules to make decisions, even very 
important decisions, because they have evolved that way. Gerd 
Gigerenzer explains his conclusions as follows: 
Intuitions based on only one good reason tend to be accurate 
when one has to predict the future (or some unknown present 
state of affairs), when the future is difficult to foresee, and 
when one has only limited information. Complex analysis, by 
contrast, pays when one has to explain the past, when the 
 
To a cognitive scientist like Andy Clark who views connectionism as the key to understanding 
the mind, any type of model based on rational choice theory, even one modified by 
experimental results, is inconsistent with what we know scientifically. 
 35. See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE 
UNCONSCIOUS (2007); MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT 
THINKING (2005). In his book, Gerd Gigerenzer begins with a lesson about the use of a rational 
cost-benefit analysis to choose a spouse. He quotes a letter Benjamin Franklin wrote to his 
nephew giving advice about how to choose between two women: 
If you doubt, set down all the Reasons, pro and con, in opposite Columns on a Sheet of 
Paper, and when you have considered them two or three Days, perform an Operation 
similar to that in some questions of Algebra; observe what Reasons or Motives in each 
Column are equal in weight, one to one, one to two, two to three, or the like, and when 
you have struck out from both Sides all the Equalities, you will see in which column 
remains the Balance. . . . This kind of Moral Algebra I have often practiced in 
important and dubious Concerns, and tho’ it cannot be mathematically exact, I have 
found it extremely useful. By the way, if you do not learn it, I apprehend you will 
never be married.  
GIGERENZER, supra, at 5. Of course, few use a rational calculus in choosing a partner; many 
aren’t even sure how they make that choice. See Bruno Frey & R. Eichenberger, Marriage 
Paradoxes, in 8 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 187 (1996). 
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future is highly predictable, or when there are large amounts of 
information.36 
He also believes that moral judgments are based on simple 
decision rules, such as “Do what the majority of your peers do” or 
“Follow the default rule.”37 However, people are unaware that they 
follow simple rules in making moral judgments: “people tend to 
believe they solve complex problems with complex strategies even if 
they rely on simple ones.”38 
 
 36. GIGERENZER, supra note 35, at 151. 
 37. Id. at 182, 191. 
 38. Id. at 194. Many studies describe the inability of people to report accurately about the 
effects of stimuli and cognitive processes. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy De Camp Wilson, 
Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, in 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REV. 23X (1977). Nisbett and Wilson conclude as follows: 
We propose that when people are asked to report how a particular stimulus influenced 
a particular response, they do so not by consulting a memory of the mediating process, 
but by applying or generating causal theories about the effects of that type of stimulus 
on that type of response. They simply make judgments, in other words, about how 
plausible it is that the stimulus would have influenced the response. These plausibility 
judgments exist prior to, or at least independently of, any actual contact with the 
particular stimulus embedded in a particular complex stimulus configuration. . . . 
 The tools that people employ when asked to make judgments about causality are 
analogues to the “representativeness heuristic” described by Tversky and Kahneman 
[citation omitted]. These writers have proposed that when making judgments about the 
probability that an individual is, say, a librarian, one does so by comparing his 
information about the individual with the contents of his stereotype concerning 
librarians. If the information is representative of the contents of the stereotype 
concerning librarians, then it is deemed “probably” that the individual is a librarian . . . 
We are proposing that a similar sort of representativeness heuristic is employed in 
assessing cause and effect relations in self-perception. Thus a particular stimulus will 
be deemed a representative cause if the stimulus and response are linked via a rule, an 
implicit theory, a presumed empirical convariation, or overlapping connotative 
networks. . . . 
 When subjects were asked about their cognitive processes, therefore, they did 
something that may have felt like introspection but which in fact may have been only a 
simple judgment of the extent to which input was a representative or plausible cause of 
output. It seems likely, in fact, that the subjects in the present studies, and ordinary 
people in their daily lives, do not even attempt to interrogate the memories about their 
cognitive processes when they are asked questions about them. Rather, they may resort 
in the first instance to a pool of culturally supplied explanations for behavior of the 
sort in question or, failing in that, begin a search through a network of connotative 
relations until they find an explanation that may be adduced as psychologically 
implying the behavior. Thus if we ask another person why he enjoyed a particular 
party and he responds with “I liked the people at the party,” we may be extremely 
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Our knowledge of the brain is too primitive to let us judge with 
any confidence which cognitive theories are correct or, at least, which 
parts of which theories are correct. Nonetheless, the theories that 
posit simple decision rules and intuition are not based on rational 
choice theory and seem more consistent with the connectionist theory 
of the mind supported by Clark. In addition, many judges and legal 
scholars have advanced the notion that some type of intuition or 
“spark” is part of decision making and that opinions are an after-the-
fact rationalization of the reasons for the decision. This notion 
extends from the Legal Realists to contemporary, respected judges. 
Richard Posner, for example, has written: 
[W]e describe the lawyer’s and the judge’s reasoning as the 
“art” of social governance by rules (which may just be a fancy 
terms for tacit inference). The fact that law schools do not 
teach a distinctive method, the heavy rhetorical element in 
judicial opinions, and the low voltage of the methods of legal 
reasoning converge to support the idea that law is indeed better 
regarded as an art (more humbly, as a craft, or, as a skill such 
as riding a bicycle or speaking a foreign language) than as a 
system of reasoning.39 
 
dubious as to whether he has reached this conclusion as a result of anything that might 
be called introspection. We are justified in suspecting that he has instead asked himself 
“Why do people enjoy parties?” and has come up with the altogether plausible 
hypothesis that in general people will like parties if they like the people at the parties. 
Id. at 249–50. 
 39. Posner, supra note 1, at 856. It would not be surprising if intuition and simple decision 
rules operated in the judicial environment described by Posner: 
The judge’s essential activity is the making of a large number of decisions in rapid 
succession, with very little feedback concerning the correctness or consequences of the 
decision. . . . He does not have the luxury of withholding decision until persuaded by 
objectively convincing arguments that the decision will be correct, and he no more 
wants to wallow in uncertainty and regrets than a law student wants to retake an exam 
in his mind after having taken it in the examination room. 
Id. at 873. Plus, “the politics of the selection process [guarantees] that many judges will be 
intellectually mediocre.” Id. at 874.  
For recognition of intuitive factors, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 2, at 165 (1993); Frederick 
Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U.L. REV. 773, 786 (1998); Simon, supra note 5, at 
4–12, 21; Singer, supra note 2, at 471–72, 542–43 (1988); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The 
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 
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Posner has also called it “naive” to believe we can “infer the nature 
of the judicial process from the rhetoric of legal opinions.”40 
Even though we lack the knowledge to explain accurately how 
judges make decisions, we do know that judicial systems do their job 
in scores of countries around the world.41 Judges reach decisions that 
uphold rights, create predictability and certainty, and support the 
workings of successful social and economic systems. While we wait 
for neuro- and cognitive scientists to give us better tools to 
understand the judicial process, we can continue to follow a 
prescription Roscoe Pound made in 1931 in response to the Legal 
Realists. Pound said that legal scholars should recognize 
. . . the existence of an alogical, unrational, subjective element 
in judicial action, and attempt by study of concrete instances of 
its operation to reach valid general conclusions as to the kinds 
of cases in which it operates most frequently, and where it 
 
(1929); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. 457, [167] (1897); Dewey, 
supra note 10, at 21–22 (1924). 
 40. Posner, supra note 1, at 865. For a concern about legal opinions not describing the 
decision-making process, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 2; Schauer, supra note 
39, at 783–84; Simon, supra note 5, at 34–38; Singer, supra note 2, at 471–72; and Dewey, 
supra note 10, at 24. 
 41. Proposals to change the manner in which judges deliberate are premature, given the 
primitive understanding of human decision-making. To give two examples of this type of 
scholarship, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich believe that deliberation 
will lead to better decisions than intuition and that intuition can be over-ridden by increased 
deliberation. To achieve this, they propose that dockets be lightened to allow more time for 
deliberation, that judges be required to write opinions in more instances, and that lawsuits be 
bifurcated as a way “to limit judges’ exposure to stimuli that are likely to trigger intuitive 
thinking.” Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey L. Rachlinski, & Andrew Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35–37 (2007). If simple rules are the innate 
basis for decision-making, more time for deliberation and avoiding stimuli may have no effect 
at all. Similarly, if opinions are just after-the-fact rationalizations for the decisions, making 
better opinions will not make better decisions. Dan Simon applies a Gestalt-based 
psychological theory that posits that people seek coherence in their cognitive processes. He 
suggests that judges be encouraged to resist the automatic process of coming to conclusions for 
the sake of consistency and to be more open to ambiguity and complexity. Simon, supra note 5, 
at 139–41 (1998). See also Simon, supra note 1. Even if the model accurately depicts decision-
making, which is far from certain, it might be impossible to achieve anything like this because 
it requires a judge to willingly change mental processes that are unknown to the judge. There is 
also a danger that extreme proposals discredit the enterprise of studying judicial decision-
making. Jerome Frank’s call for the Freudian analysis of all judges must have been laughable to 
many, to the discredit of the entire Legal Realism movement. 
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operated most effectively or most unhappily for the ends of the 
legal order.42 
This brings us to the importance of constraints on judicial 
decision-making, which act to minimize the effects of belief systems, 
random intuitions, and other hidden factors that make case outcomes 
unpredictable and surprising. 
IV. CONSTRAINTS TO INDUCE “RATIONAL” DECISION-MAKING 
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society—humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. They structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic.43 Institutions can be formal, such as written laws, or 
informal, such as norms. Institutions are not the only constraint on 
human interaction, however. Market forces, for example, are a 
powerful constraint on economic actions. These types of constraints 
can channel an individual’s actions to make it appear that the person 
is acting rationally when she is not. As Satz and Ferejohn explain the 
process: “the [traditional] theory of rational choice is most powerful 
in contexts where choice is limited.”44 The structures in which the 
individual is embedded channel her conduct, rather than her own 
cognitive processes driving her action.45 The success of the economic 
neoclassical price theory model in both explaining and predicting 
some market outcomes is an illustration of the effect of constraints. 
The model is based on some assumptions that do not reflect reality; 
for example, it posits that producers maximize profits. That is an 
impossibility because accounting profits, calculated by firms, are 
different than economic profits. Further, studies of firm behavior 
show that firms attempt to maximize market share rather than 
 
 42. Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 710 
(1931). 
 43. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). 
 44. Satz & Ferejohn, supra note 27, at 72. 
 45. Andy Clark, Economic Reason: The Interplay of Individual Learning and External 
Structure, in FRONTIERS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 269, 272 (John N. Drobak & 
John V.C. Nye eds., 1997). 
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profits.46 Nonetheless, market competition and the need for solvency 
as a condition of survival make the firm behave as if it were 
maximizing economic profits.47 
Legal Realists and contemporary critics of the rational model of 
judicial decision-making have focused on the discretion that remains 
for judges when applying statutes and case law. There is another 
conclusion to be drawn, however. Constitutions, statutes, regulations, 
and case law do constrain judges, although to differing degrees in 
different situations. For example, if a state statute plainly prohibits 
public school teachers from striking, it will be very difficult for a 
state court to permit teachers to strike. Perhaps a court here and there 
can glean some ambiguity in the statute or find the statute to be 
inconsistent with the state constitution, but the vast majority of courts 
will just follow the statute. Some Legal Realists tried to limit 
discretion by new detailed statutes, the Uniform Commercial Code 
being the most famous example.48 Likewise, the methodology of 
construing statutes and using cases also limits the possible outcomes. 
These rules of decision-making would be of little value, however, 
without ways to enforce them. The hierarchy of a court system is a 
key component of judicial constraints. With appellate courts and a 
supreme court having the power to reverse lower courts, a 
hierarchical court system provides an important enforcement 
mechanism for assuring that inferior courts follow the established 
rules. The structure of courts also affects the discretion of individual 
judges. On the United States Supreme Court, nine justices must reach 
decisions, while constitutional courts have much larger panels that 
dilute the importance of one judge’s vote. 
 
 46. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 46 (1990). 
 47. Clark, supra note 45, at 272–75. Denzau and North provide a vivid example of the 
effect of constraints in a comparison of trading by constrained zero intelligence traders 
(computer modeled agents who could not theorize, recall events or try to maximize returns) 
with human traders. Unconstrained traders did very poorly in a double auction game until 
constrained by a decision rule that allowed bids only when they would not yield an immediate 
loss. This decision rule increased the traders’ efficiency by 75%. When the computer traders 
were replaced by humans, efficiency increased only 1% more. Denzau & North, supra note 33, 
at 5. See Clark, supra note 45, at 273–75. 
 48. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 2, at xiv; Richard Danzig, A Comment on 
the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); SINGER, 
supra note 2, at 471; Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the 
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
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In addition to statutes and case law, many other formal and 
informal institutions constrain judges. There are forms of political 
control of the judiciary and of individual judges in every country in 
the world.49 The use of impeachment of judges for political reasons is 
a terrible, extreme example, but it has been and is still practiced in 
many countries. Even in the United States, where Congress’s last 
attempt to impeach a federal judge for political reasons failed in 1804 
when former state supreme court judges broke ranks with President 
Thomas Jefferson, individual members of Congress have used the 
media to stir up public sentiment for impeaching judges who take 
unpopular positions. The same holds on the state level, although it 
usually arises in re-election campaigns of judges rather than in state 
impeachment proceedings. Jurisdiction stripping is another tool for 
asserting political control of judges.50 Self-restraint by courts, 
through such things as justiciability rules, is also important. Self-
restraint is a two-way process, however, as Congress has limited its 
use of political tools like impeachment and jurisdiction stripping to 
achieve a balance with the courts. 
Constraints also arise from judicial norms. For example, Judge 
Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has tried to 
instill collegiality among all the judges on a court and to discourage 
dissenting opinions. He believes that compromise among the various 
positions taken by individual judges leads to better decisions and 
helps a court to better fulfill its limited role in the governance 
structure.51 In Japan, judges are promoted based upon performance 
evaluations by senior judges, so the standards and objectives of the 
senior judges constrain the actions of judges who desire promotions. 
Of course, ethical standards and self-regulation through judicial 
commissions also cabin judges’ actions. Judges are also constrained 
 
 49. See John Ferejohn & Larry Kramer, Judicial Independence in a Democracy: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, in NORMS AND THE LAW 161, 167–78 (John N. Drobak 
ed., 2006). 
 50. For example, after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Pledge of 
Allegiance unconstitutionally violated the first amendment because it contains the words “under 
God,” successive Congresses attempted to prevent the federal courts from hearing challenges to 
the Pledge of Allegiance by requiring those lawsuits to be heard in state courts. 
 51. Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Norms: A Judge’s Perspective, in NORMS AND THE LAW 
230, 237–38 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006). Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on 
Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003). 
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by the society in which they live; they are subject to contemporary 
culture, values, and norms, as we all are.52 And feedback from court 
decisions, both in terms of social commentary and visible effects on 
economic and social affairs, surely creates some incentives for 
different outcomes in subsequent cases. Education also reinforces the 
rational doctrinal method of decision-making. From the time judges 
were law students and throughout their careers as lawyers and judges, 
they are told repeatedly that legal decisions turn on accepted methods 
of doctrinal analysis. In addition, continuously going through the 
process of analyzing and applying statutes and cases must reinforce 
how the brain processes information and reaches decisions.53 
The formal and informal constraints discussed above must limit 
the influence of discretion and non-doctrinal factors in many cases. In 
other cases, the constraints work to make it appear as if judicial 
decisions are formed after logical deliberation with accepted methods 
of doctrinal analysis. These constraints may play another important 
role by creating the environment in which judges make their 
decisions. Some cognitive scientists believe that in order to 
understand human problem solving, it is crucial to examine 
deliberation in context, not in isolation. Edwin Hutchins argues that 
we cannot adequately understand cognition without accounting for 
the fact that “culture, context, and history ... are fundamental aspects 
of human cognition and cannot be comfortably integrated into a 
perspective that privileges abstract properties of isolated individual 
minds.” The basic task is one of “locating cognitive activity in 
context, where context is not a fixed set of surrounding conditions but 
a wider dynamical process of which cognition of the individual is 
only a part.”54 Consequently, under this systems approach, the output 
of the courts should be the central concern, as opposed to the thought 
 
 52. Lawrence Friedman, Judging the Judges, in NORMS AND THE LAW, supra note 49, at 
139, 149–55. 
 53. Andy Clark told one of the authors that law professors are much more efficient and 
quicker at reading court opinions than law students because professors have been reinforcing a 
particular brain function for years, often decades. This is similar to the “muscle memory” that is 
so important to the training of athletes and musicians. 
 54. EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD xiii (1995). See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 33–34 (2005). 
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processes in a judge’s mind separated from the environment of the 
litigation process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The theories of rational choice and neoclassical economics are 
useful models at the core of social science and economics. Similarly, 
the logical, doctrinal model of judicial decision-making is at the core 
of legal analysis. Even though we know that humans often fail to act 
rationally, all three models successfully serve their purposes, due in 
large part to the constraints on human behavior. We suspect that the 
constraints discussed above are a powerful influence limiting the 
effects of discretion and non-doctrinal factors in the vast majority of 
lawsuits. Similarly, non-doctrinal factors are likely most influential in 
cases involving controversial social issues, especially at the Supreme 
Court level where the constraints are the weakest. Given the current 
state of our understanding of human decision-making, it is impossible 
to reach a definitive conclusion on this issue, however. 
It would have been better if we could have used this Article to 
propose an accurate model to replace the rational choice theory of 
judicial decision-making. Although behavioral psychologists and 
cognitive scientists have studied decision-making for centuries, our 
knowledge of the brain’s processes is still very primitive. This is no 
criticism of scholars in those fields. It just reflects the difficulty of the 
problems they try to understand by using the ineffective tools and 
elementary knowledge supplied by medical science. With brain 
scanning, chemical testing, and other new techniques, researchers are 
pushing the frontiers of medical knowledge of the brain’s processes. 
But there is still a great amount of research to be done. It is important 
for scholars—from medicine, psychology, cognition, economics, and 
law—to continue to probe the human decision-making processes. 
However, until we truly understand much more about how people 
make decisions, we cannot replace the rationality-based models. 
Consequently, those working with the law must continue to 
concentrate on the visible part of judging. We know that the effects 
of belief systems and other non-doctrinal factors play a role in all 
judicial systems, albeit to varying degrees, so legal scholars will 
continue to study and speculate about these hidden factors. For now 
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and for probably a long time to come, it is sensible for lawyers and 
judges to disregard the unknown and to continue to participate in 
what appears to be a rational, doctrinal legal process. 
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